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VERBAL MISCONDUCT IN THE COURTROOM
-ARE ATTORNEYS IMMUNE?
Since ancient times, the attorney's duty has been to advocate
his client's cause with vigor and zeal.' But this duty has long been
subject to limitations designed to preserve the integrity of the
judicial process. 2 An attorney is obligated to protect the interests
of his client.3 However, if he speaks or behaves in such a way that
respect for and confidence in the judicial office is undermined, he
may be cited for contempt of court.4 Moreover, if he speaks or be-
haves in such a way as to create or promote an unfair bias against
the defendant, the plaintiff, a witness, or the court, a favorable
judgment may be overturned by an appellate court upon a finding
of prejudicial misconduct amounting to error.5 Thus the theory goes:
if an attorney oversteps the line between verbal misconduct impugn-
ing the court and legitimate argument, the court may cite him for
contempt; if he oversteps the line between verbal misconduct con-
stituting prejudicial error and advocacy appropriate to the heat of
battle, a higher court may reverse for error. The judges holding
the contempt and reversal powers view the system as being equi-
table in the long run. The attorney may appeal the contempt order,
and a party aggrieved by an alleged prejudicial statement may
petition a higher court on that claim.
But the line between verbal misconduct and statements within
the bounds of legitimate argument is not a line at all: it is at best
an unpredictable and erratically defined gray area whose shadings
change from case to case and from judge to judge. In California, the
kinds of courtroom conduct that may be deemed contemptuous are
purportedly set out 'by statute.' At best, however, the statutes-
always subject to interpretation by the courts-do not provide a
very helpful guideline for a trial attorney. The power to summarily
punish an attorney for contempt of court remains solely within the
I As early as the first century B.C., Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.),
regarded as the ancient world's greatest orator-advocate, was energetically and
persuasively proclaiming legal arguments in behalf of clients. AmERICAN PEOPLES
ENCYCLOPEDIA, Vol. 5, pg. 5-468 (1948).
2 CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 6068(b) (West 1962) provides: "It is the duty
of an attorney to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
office."
3 Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 298, 359 P.2d 274, 278, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 846 (1961).
4 See In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893).
5 See People v. Braun, 14 Cal. 2d 1, 92 P.2d 402 (1939).
6 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1209, 1210 (West 1955); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 166,
1331 (West 1970).
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discretion of the trial judge.7 What is worse-from a client's point
of view-is that an attorney's verbal misconduct causing or pro-
moting prejudicial error too often goes unchecked at the trial level.
There are no guiding statutes to indicate to an attorney that saying
such-and-such a thing in such-and-such a way might amount to
contempt or prejudicial error in the eyes of the court. Today, an
attorney who zealously argues his case does so at his peril.
This comment examines recent California cases involving con-
tempt and prejudicial error committed by attorneys. It will show
that existing procedures for dealing with the problem are inadequate
because of a lack of enforceable standards. In addition to revealing
the need for uniform enforcement of recommended disciplinary rules,
the author proposes changes in existing judicial procedures. These
changes would operate to reduce the number of appeals now pro-
cessed by appellate courts in California.8
BACKGROUND-PRESENT MEANS OF DEALING WITH ATTORNEY
VERBAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA COURTROOMS
Contempt Citations
The California case law indicates that a contempt of court
may be committed by an attorney by spoken words, by insolent
or contemptuous behavior,9 or by both.' Spoken words, even if not
in themselves contemptuous, may constitute contempt if uttered in
an "insolent or defiant manner."" However, case law does not pro-
vide the exclusive criteria for determining contemptuous conduct
in California. The California Code of Civil Procedure suggests the
kinds of behavior that may constitute contempt of court: con-
temptuous, disorderly, or insolent behavior toward a judge; 12 acts
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial;" certain specified acts
7 In re Hallinan, 71 A.C. 1221, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
8 Mr. Chief Justice Burger has declared that ways must be found to cut
down on the huge numbers of appeals that now pass from lower to higher courts,
often doubling, and sometines tripling, the amount of time given an individual
case. Address by Mr. Chief Justice Burger on the State of the Judiciary-1970,
at the ABA Annual Meeting, August 1970, in 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 934 (1970). It may
be that if trial attorneys' convictions for misconduct could be fairly dealt with
through means other than by petition to an appellate court for hearing, the problem
that Chief Justice Burger points out could be greatly alleviated simply because
of the great numbers of appeals that could bypass the appellate courts. This con-
cept will be explored later in this comment.
9 Ex parte Hallinan, 126 Cal. App. 121, 14 P.2d 797 (1932).
10 See Ex parte Grossman, 109 Cal. App. 625, 293 P. 683 (1930).
11 Ex parte Hallinan, 126 Cal. App. 121, 14 P.2d 797 (1932); accord, Rose
v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 418, 35 P.2d 605 (1934).
12 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1209(1) (West 1955).
18 Id. § 1209(2).
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by an attorney, clerk, sheriff, or coroner; 14 and "other unlawful
interference with the process or proceedings of a court." 5 The Penal
Code lists several of these same acts, as well as some others, as
misdemeanors and punishable as contempt.'
Theoretically, in a given instance of verbal misbehavior, the
trial judge interprets the statutes dealing with contempt. In a rela-
tively short time he must decide whether or not to cite the offender
for contempt of court. A trial attorney in danger of being cited
therefore may find himself-at least momentarily-in a position
where the judge hearing his case assumes a role not unlike that of an
adversary attempting to squelch a particular element of his argu-
ment. What effect, one may ask, does one or more citations for
contempt have on a trial attorney's subsequent statements and man-
ner before the same judge who cited him? Is the summary contempt
power a tool by which judges shape and reform arguments, muzzle
overzealous attorneys, or settle differences of opinion with respect
to close questions of law? How effective can a judicial system be
where the trial judge must not only rule on the correctness of the
law but is charged with sole responsibility for disciplining counsel's
misconduct as well?
Reversal for Prejudicial Error
It is proper for a trial judge to instruct a jury to base its
verdict exclusively on the evidence and to disregard statements made
in the courtroom that amount to misconduct.'l Sometimes such
instructions may cure the error and prevent a reversal of the trial
court's judgment.'8 Other appellate courts, however, hold that such
instructions do not prevent a reversal on grounds of prejudicial
misconduct. 9 It is extremely difficult to cure a prejudicial error
committed in the presence of a jury. Instructing the jury to disregard
the prejudicial comments is "like an attempt to unblow a blown
horn. '20 Here, as with contempt, the trial attorney does not have a
suitable guideline for determining whether his conduct is preventing
a defendant from having that "fair and impartial trial which the
14 Id. § 1209(3).
15 Id. § 1209(8).
16 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 166, 723, 724, 907, 1331 (West 1970).
'T See People v. Kirkes, 39 Cal. 2d 719, 249 P.2d 1 (1952).
18 People v. Jackson, 59 Cal. 2d 375, 379 P.2d 937 (1963); People v. Brice, 49
Cal. 2d 434, 317 P.2d 961 (1957); People v. Hampton, 47 Cal. 2d 239, 302 P.2d 300
(1956).
19 People v. Berryman, 6 Cal. 2d 331, 57 P.2d 136 (1936); People v. Fleming,
166 Cal. 357, 136 P. 291 (1913).
20 Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 300, 359 P.2d 274, 280, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 848 (1961).
19701
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
law requires for every person charged with a crime. 21 An experi-
enced trial attorney knows that appellate courts are somewhat
reluctant to reverse a trial court judgment where the attorney ac-
cused of prejudical misconduct during the trial is the prosecutor.22
A prosecuting attorney is given wide latitude in his statements,
right or wrong, and an appellate court will reverse only where it is
"clear from all the facts that there has been a miscarriage of
justice."23 This procedure resounds heavily upon the defendant in
the trial court. Although still presumed innocent by the law, he
often must endure verbal abuse from a prosecuting attorney who,
with almost total immunity, may mercilessly deride and soundly
humiliate him. The question that poses itself in this situation is not
only that of how far a prosecuting attorney may go before he is
guilty of prejudicial misconduct, but also how long and to what ex-
tent the victim of his misconduct must endure the effects of the
damaging statements before a ruling on assignment of error comes
down from some appellate court.
NEEDED: ENFORCEABLE AND UNIFORM DISCIPLINARY RULES
California needs to establish uniform and definitive guidelines
for attorney verbal behavior during trials to minimize instances of
criminal contempt and prejudicial error. To this end the California
Legislature and State Bar Association should examine closely the
provisions of the American Bar Association's new Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 4 Canon DR 7-106(C) of the Code formulates
the following clearly stated rules governing courtroom conduct: 2
"DR 7-106(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a
tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis
to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported
by admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe
is relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a wit-
ness or other person.
21 People v. Braun, 14 Cal. 2d 1, 7, 92 P.2d 402, 405 (1939).
22 See People v. Ross, 178 Cal. App. 2d 801, 3 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1960); People
v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958); People v. Kirkes, 39 Cal. 2d 719,
249 P.2d 1 (1952).
23 Id. See also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4.5 (West 1954).
24 ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
JuDiciAi ETHIcs (1970).
25 The code contains nine Canons in all, each with its own rules and ethical
considerations; discussion of the merits of each of these is beyond the scope of
this comment. (For a general comparison of the provisions of Canon 7 with ex-
isting California law, see Comment, Professional Responsibility in Client Repre-
sentation--A Re-evaluation, 10 SANTA CLaRA LAW. 112, 148 (1969).
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• (3) Assert his personal, knowledge of the facts in -issue, except
when testifying asa witness.
(4) Assert his personal. opinion as to the justness of a cause, as
to the credibility of a witness as to- the culpability of a civil
litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of the accused; but
he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any posi-
tion or conclusion with respect to the matters herein.
(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or
practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to
opposing counsel timely notice of his intent not to comply.
(6) Engage in undignified -or discourteous conduct which is de-
grading to a tribunal.
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of
procedure or of evidence."
California should incorporate the specific provisions of Canon
DR 7-106(C) into the state's substantive law so that they will have
binding legal effect.26 The provisions clarify and strengthen ethical
standards for trial lawyers; and unlike the now outdated Canons of
Professional Ethics, the new provisions lend themselves to practical
application. Canon DR 7-106(C) does not contain recommendations
as to specific disciplinary actions to be taken against attorneys who
commit verbal misconduct in a courtroom-instigation of these
actions is left to the disciplinary agencies of each state. The Canon's
provisions are aimed at realistic substantive rules for courtroom
conduct that trial attorneys could safely observe and properly rely
upon.
RECENT CASES
The existence of a few clearly defined rules of verbal conduct,
such as those proposed above, might well have obviated the sort of
appeal taken in People v. Kirkes.27 In that case a defendant was
convicted in the trial court of murder in the second degree. On
appeal, the defendant charged that certain statements made during
the trial 'by the deputy district attorney were grossly unfair and
unsupported by the evidence s.2
After the murder trial had been underway for some time, the
deputy district attorney approached the jury box, proffering the
following comments to the jury:
As member of the District Attorney's Office of this County [for 19
consecutive years] I have taken an oath to prosecute cases to the
26 The method of incorporation will be discussed later in this comment.
27 39 Cal. 2d 719, 249 P.2d 1 (1952).
28 He also charged that several instructions given to the jury and certain
rulings of the court upon the admission of evidence were prejudicially erroneous.
People v. Kirkes, 39 Cal. 2d 719, 721, 249 P.2d 1, 3 (1952).
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best of my ability. If, during the conduct of this trial I have been-
I have appeared to you to have been overly aggressive or tenacious,
then I say to you that I was following out that oath, that in all sin-
cerity I believe and I still believe and knew prior to the time that I
became associated in this particular prosecution in the month of
October, that this particular Defendant was guilty of this particular
offense. I would not have been associated with the prosecution of this
particular case unless I had so believed.2
The California Supreme Court granted a new trial. In a vigor-
ously written opinion, the court said that unfounded statements
made by a prosecuting attorney constitute misconduct. The court
noted that not only did the deputy district attorney state his belief
in the defendant's guilt, but he also flatly stated that he knew of
defendant's guilt prior to the time that he entered the case. Quoting
with approval from People v. Podwys, 0 the court said that "[t]here
can be no excuse for such conduct.' 's3
The court's reasoning in Kirkes is, of course, unassailable. The
unfortunate aspect of the case, and there are many similar cases, is
that the issue of the prosecutor's misconduct during the trial reached
the highest tribunal in the state. Had provisions (C) (1),2 (C)
(3),5 and (C)(4)84 of Canon DR 7-106(C) been in effect as
enforceable rules of conduct at the time of the murder trial, grounds
for the appeal just described would not have materialized. The
existence of clear and explicit rules like those of Canon DR 7-106
(C)-having the force of law-would have acted as a deterrent to
such conduct. Proper observance of the rules of DR 7-106(C) by
attorneys could help minimize appeals such as that taken in Kirkes.
29 Id. at 722, 249 P.2d at 3.
3o 6 Cal. App. 2d 71, 44 P.2d 377 (1935).
31 People v. Kirkes, 39 Cal. 2d 719, 723, 249 P.2d 1, 4 (1952).
82 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON DR 7-106(C) (1) (1970):
"In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe
is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence."
as ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON DR 7-106(C)(3)
(1970):
"... [A] lawyer shall not:
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying
as a witness."
84 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON DR 7-106(C)(4) (1970):
. [A] lawyer shall not:
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused; but he may argue, on his analysis
of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters
herein."
[Vol. 11
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But more importantly, the rules could serve to prevent violation of
defendants' rights during trial.
The lack of enforceable standards governing attorney verbal
misconduct has led to inconsistent treatment of the problem by the
courts. In some cases, overreaching and gross verbal misconduct
extremely detrimental to an accused has been held not to constitute
prejudicial error and reversal has been denied. In others, appellate
courts have found reversible prejudicial error grounded on compara-
tively mild statements made during trial.
In People v. Ross, 5 strong statements and improper question-
ing by a prosecuting attorney were held not to constitute prejudicial
error. The defendant was charged with statutory rape"' and lewd
and lascivious conduct.3 7 During the trial, and in the presence of the
judge and jury, the district attorney, after referring to defendant
as "a very strange man indeed," 8 made the following remark con-
cerning the defendant: "If the testimony is true, he's got the sexual
appetite of a barbarian or an ape.""
The district attorney then chided a defense witness who at the
time of trial was serving a two-year term in the county jail for drunk-
driving. He first told the jury that the witness was presently incar-
cerated on a drunk driving charge and had served prison terms for
two different felonies. Then the district attorney challenged the wit-
ness: "Is it possible,... by the fact that you're doing two years in
the County Jail for violation of-five violations of Section 502,
drunk driving, that you figure you have got nothing to lose in this
Courtroom?"4
On appeal, the defendant contended that these questions were
improper and degrading. The court, however, refused to reverse the
conviction. It found that evidence of the defendant's guilt was very
strong, that no prejudicial error was committed, and that even if the
defendant were correct in some of his contentions of error, no mis-
carriage of justice resulted.4 1
In People v. Bandhauer,4 2 the district attorney declared to the
jury that he believed the defendant was guilty and should be given
35 178 Cal. App. 2d 801, 3 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1960).
36 CAL. PEN. CODE § 261(1) (West 1970).
37 Id. § 288.
88 People v. Ross, 178 Cal. App. 2d 801, 808, 3 Cal. Rptr. 170, 174 (1960).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 807, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
41 Id. at 809, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
42 66 Cal. 2d 524, 426 P.2d 900, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1967).
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the death penalty. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of
first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal to the
California Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the prose-
cutor had gradually injected prejudicial. statements into his argu-
ment in the penalty phase of the trial. When grounds for objection
became apparent it was too late to cure the error by admonition or
retraction. The California Supreme Court found that the prose-
cutor's statements made during trial on the issue of guilt were not
prejudicial but that later, during the penalty phase of the trial, the
prosecutor's language had become stronger.
The prosecutor began his argument on the issue of penalty by
informing the jury that he was running for office and that as a public
officer he bore a mantle of trust that required him to be fair.43 He
continued to speak at great length about how interested he was in
seeing justice served, stating that it was his desire to see the defen-
dant treated fairly. 4 Then he began to delve into the brutal nature
of the killing for which the defendant was charged-the fact that
the defendant had "emptied this gun into his victim's body, some
from the back and some from the front."45 He drew attention to the
defendant's long history of criminal conduct and other antisocial
conduct. Then he declared to the jury:
During the many years that I have been a prosecutor, I have seen
some pretty depraved character [sic]. Usually they are kind of old
because it takes a little while to become this depraved. But it has
seldom been my misfortune to see a more deprave [sic] character
than this one. If Mr. Walter Ashley Smith has forfeited his right to
live at the hands of Mr. Bandhauer, I don't think that we should be
particularly upset about Mr. Bandhauer now having to forfeit his life
for the life that he has led in the past few years. It is not a very
equal trade, is it?46
The prosecutor pursued his urgings for the death penalty. He
told the jury that in some first-degree murder cases in which he had
been the prosecutor, he had not demanded the death penalty but had
recommended life imprisonment. He cited two examples of cases
where the death penalty might not be justified. The first was a crime
of passion where a spouse is found in a compromising position by
the other spouse.4T The other was a crime in which the particular
participant took no active part in a robbery and murder except to
drive the getaway-car and had told his partner not to use a loaded
48 People v. Bandhauer, 66 Cal. 2d 524, 529, 426 P.2d 900, 904, 58 Cal. Rptr.
332, 336 (1967).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 533, 426 P.2d at 906, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
46 Id. at 534, 426 P.2d at 906, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
47 Id. at 534, 426 P.2d at 907, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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gun because he did not want to be involved in a killing.48 The prose-
cutor then said to the jury:
[Y]ou don't have just a trigger man. You have a vicious, cold-blooded
killer here. This man wanted to make sure Mr. Walter Ashley Smith
was dead. There was only one reason for that-so he couldn't get
on this witness stand and tell us what happened. This man has had
enough of State Prison and didn't want to go back, and the one man
who could send him back ... was Mr. Walter Ashley Smith.
49
The California Supreme Court reversed the penalty judgment,
but affirmed the judgment as to guilt. The court ruled that the
statement that the defendant was one of the most depraved charac-
ters that the prosecutor had ever seen was testimonial and not
related to the evidence in the case.5 0 It presented to the jury an
external standard by which to fix the penalty, based on the prosecu-
tor's long experience. 1 The error was aggravated, said the court, by
the prosecutor's telling the jury that he would recommend life im-
prisonment in a proper case, for he thus made it clear that his re-
quest for the death penalty was based on his personal judgment and
belief. 2
The preceding case, like Kirkes, Ross, and many others,
5
shows the need for invoking Canon DR 7-106(C) against errant
attorneys who commit verbal misconduct. But the Canon's provi-
sions could also be used to protect the rights of attorneys as well.
If the Canon were considered the basic guideline for acceptable
verbal conduct, any allegation of attorney misbehavior-such as a
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 529-30, 426 P.2d at 904, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
51 Id. at 530, 426 P.2d at 904, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 336..
52 Id.
53 In People v. Carr, 163 Cal. App. 2d 568, 329 P.2d 746 (1958), unsupported
statements in the prosecutor's opening statement, together with a statement in his
dosing argument that defendants "were out working at their trade" of robbers,
for which there was no support in the evidence, combined to bring about a reversal
for prejudicial error. See also People v. Vienne, 142 Cal. App. 2d 172, 297 P.2d
1027 (1956), where the deputy district attorney ignored admonishments of the
court and referred to the defendant as a professional gunman. The appellate court
held that there was no evidence to support such a remark. People v. Perez, 58
Cal. 2d 229, 373 P.2d 617, 23 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1962), involved a conviction for
the sale of heroin. The California Supreme Court reversed because of the prose-
cutor's highly improper questioning and argument on matters on which he had
offered no proof. In People v. Beal, 116 Cal. App. 2d 475, 254 P.2d 100 (1953),
and People v. Tale, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 245 P.2d 633 (1952), the courts, as
in Perez and Carr, reversed because of prejudicial statements made by the prose-
cutor. People v. Shaffer, 150 Cal. App. 2d 287, 309 P.2d 475 (1957); People v.
Brophy, 122 Cal. App. 2d 638, 265 P.2d 593 (1954); and People v. Hail, 25 Cal.
App. 342, 143 P.2d 803 (1914), were reversed for misconduct where "the evi-
dence presented a dose question. of fact," and the prosecutor argued matters for
which there was no evidentiary support.
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contempt citation by a trial judge--could be measured against the
Canon's provisions. The Canon would thus serve to establish a
bulwark against unjustified contempt actions against trial attorneys
such as arose in People v. Finch and Pappa.54 In that case, Grant B.
Cooper was acting as a defense counsel for a defendant charged with
murder in the first degree. The following verbal exchange took place
in the presence of jurors, defendants, and counsel:
THE COURT ... To my mind the testimony given by the [prosecu-
tion] witness John Cody [who had testified, in effect, that he had been
employed by the defendants in the murder case to kill Finch's wife]
regarding the purpose for which he was employed by the defendants
was more believable than the testimony of the two defendants on that
subject.
MR. COOPER [petitioner herein]: If your Honor please-
THE COURT: Now Mr. Cooper, I don't want a word out of either
one of you.
MR. COOPER: If your Honor please, as a lawyer I have a right to
address this court.
THE COURT: You don't have a right to say a word when the jury
is down here in the process of their deliberations, and I instruct you
and Mr. Bringgold [counsel for defendant Pappa] to keep seated and
wait until the jury is out to make your objections.
MR. COOPER: If your Honor please, I feel your Honor has no right
to invade the province of the jury.
THE COURT: Mr. Cooper, I hold you directly in contempt.
MR. COOPER: Very well, your Honor.
THE COURT: I will dispose of the matter as soon as I have in-
structed this jury.
MR. COOPER: Very well, if your Honor please, it is your Honor's
prerogative.
THE COURT: It certainly is, and I am going to exericse it. 5
After the judge had concluded his remarks, he asked the jury
to retire and deliberate. Before the jurors left the courtroom, how-
ever, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: One thing more before you go, you should not in any
way consider in your deliberations the fact that the Court felt it
necessary to hold Mr. Cooper in contempt. That was nothing to do
with the issues in this case, and it should not be considered by you
at all. That is all.
MR. COOPER: Your Honor-
THE COURT: Just a minute, Mr. Cooper-
MR. COOPER: I have a right to address the Court.
THE COURT: You do not; while the jury is here you do not have
any such right; you sit down.
MR. COOPER: If your Honor please, I feel your Honor has invaded
the province of the jury.
54 Los Angeles Superior Court Number 220164, Nov. 7, 1960.
55 Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 295-96, 359 P.2d 274, 276-77,
10 Cal. Rptr. 843, 844-45 (1961).
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THE COURT: That is a matter of subsequent argument; I again hold
you in contempt, Mr. Cooper. You sit down, and then I will let you
say what you want to say. You have no business saying anything in
the presence of this jury.56
Only after the jury had left the room was Cooper allowed to present
his objections to the comments of the court.
A hearing was held at which Cooper was sentenced to pay a fine
of $250 on each of the two counts of contempt or to serve one day
in jail for each $100 thereof. Cooper appealed." The California Su-
preme Court, in an opinion in which Justice Schauer strongly criti-
cized the trial judge's conduct, annulled the judgment of contempt.
The court held that the trial judge had no more right to invade the
province of the jury during deliberations than did counsel, and that
the order of the judge in attempting to still Cooper's valid objections
was not a lawful order.
The holding in Cooper simply strengthens an earlier opinion
handed down by the California Supreme Court in Gallagher v. Mu-
nicipal Court.58 In that case, the court had implied that an order that
results in silencing an attorney before he has had an adequate op-
portunity to make a timely objection is not a lawful order. The
Cooper case undoubtedly enunciates good law, but it is one of the
few cases that provides trial attorneys and judges with a practical
rule concerning permissible verbal conduct during a trial." Adoption
of the fundamental rules of Canon DR 7-106(C) could go a long
way toward relieving the California Supreme Court of the dubious
task of formulating rules for trial conduct one at a time.
PROPOSED BLUEPRINTS FOR ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
The aftermath of the spectacular and unduly celebrated Chi-
cago Seven trial has produced several proposals for solving the
56 Id. at 297, 359 P.2d at 277-78, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
57 Id.
58 31 Cal. 2d 784, 192 P.2d 905 (1948).
59 In a recent case, the California Supreme Court confirmed another singular
but useful rule concerning contempt rulings. A defense attorney was charged with
two instances of contemptuous conduct for his "antagonistic, insulting, and disrespect-
ful tone of voice." The court reversed the trial judge's order, noting in the opinion
that the trial judge had failed to warn the attorney that his statements and manner
were objectionable before citing him for contempt. Writing for the court, Justice
-Burke stated the rule of the case: If the words used by counsel are respectful and
pertinent to the matter before the court, before citing him for contempt it is not
unnecessarily burdensome to require the judge to first warn the attorney that his
tone and facial expressions are offensive and tend to interrupt the due course of
the proceedings. In re Hallinan, 71 A C. 1221, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
1970]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
difficult problems of disciplining errant attorneys."0 In California,
Attorney-General Evelle Younger, then the District Attorney of
Los Angeles County, told a Monterey, California, audience in a
September speech that there is a "crisis in the criminal courts, with
delays threatening the entire law enforcement system." 6' In that
speech, Younger outlined certain proposals that he will present to
the 1971 California Legislature for dealing with the crisis. These
proposals include: "2
o Disciplinary proceedings including disbarment for lawyers who en-
gage in antagonistic, offensive, or insulting court conduct.
o Certification of attorneys by the state bar as professionally com-
petent to represent defendants in capital cases.
o Adoption of the federal system whereby prospective jurors in
criminal cases are examined by a judge or commissioner, rather
than by attorneys involved in the trial. 3
While these recommendations address themselves directly to
the need for effective attorney discipline in California, they are
likely to meet with considerable resistance from trial attorneys who
might not endorse such sweeping changes in existing procedures.
The best of the recommendations to date appear to be those pre-
sented in July of this year by retired Supreme Court Justice Tom
C. Clark's American Bar Association Committee for Disciplinary
Enforcement. In a 190-page study,64 Justice Clark's committee
reported on the existence of what he termed a "scandalous situation
60 Following this trial, the American College of Trial Lawyers warned in a
twenty-three-page report that disruptive courtroom tactics that convert trials into
spectacles of disorder and even violence pose a new, direct, jugular threat to thejudicial process. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORTS AND RECO--MN-
DATIONS ON DISRUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1970). The ACTL report con-
tends that while there is need for vigorous prosecution and defense in trial cases,as well as for firm guidance by the trial judge, there-are also limits as to what lengths
defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge in a court case may go. The report
recommends, among other things, the use of summary contempt power; sanctions
to limit an attorney's right to appear in court; immediate appellate review; and
references sent to appropriate disciplinary bodies concerning improper conduct by
either lawyers or judges for expedited action. The College's proposals, however,
already are drawing heavy fire from trial attorneys. Alfred S. Julian, President
of the New York Metropolitan Trial Lawyers Association, a 37-year-old organiza-
tion with approximately 200 members in the New York area, warns that the public
will not long be properly represented'if the bar becomes subservient and pusil-
lanimous. Julian feels that the drastic remedies suggested by the College constitute
a dangerous threat to the independence of the bar.
61 San Jose Mercury, Sept. 26, 1970, at 2, col. 4.
62 Recommendations quoted here are limited to those that deal directly with
the present discussion.
.68 San Jose Mercury, Sept. 26, 1970, at 2, col, .4.
64 ABA, PROBLEMS AND -RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
(1970).
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that requires the immediate, attention of the profession..". The
report-said to be the .most thorough national study ever made of
the disciplinary processes of the legal profession-66 -contains 36
sweeping recommendations. 7 The proposals cope with the difficult
problems in formulating and enforcing any uniform scheme for
disciplining errant attorneys. Justice Clark and his committee want
to see the creation, in each state, of powerful statewide lawyer dis-
ciplinary agencies with ultimate authority resting in the highest
court of the state. 8
CONCLUSION
It may be fortunate indeed that the structure, if not the sub-
stance, of California's present scheme for dealing with attorney
verbal misconduct is not too far afield from the measures proposed
by Justice Clark's committee. Disciplinary proceedings against at-
torneys in California are already within the jurisdiction of the
California Supreme Court and the State Bar Board of Governors.
The California Supreme Court, for example, may suspend or disbar
an attorney for disobedience of an order of the court,69 violation of
his oath or statutory duties, 70 or commission of any act involving
moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption.71 The California State
Bar Board of Governors may hold a hearing on any of the above
05 Id. at 1.
66 Bernard G. Segal, President, American Bar Association. Los Angeles Daily
Journal, Jul. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
67 Highlights of the committee's 36 recommendations are:
-Centralization of disciplinary jurisdiction in statewide agencies with ultimate au-
thority resting in the highest court in the state. Larger states might consider "field
units" for efficiency and coordination. A major benefit of statewide jurisdiction
would be uniformity of investigations and punishment.
-The agencies would be professionally staffed and funds for operation would
come from both private and public sources including bar associations, public
revenue, and assessment of costs against a respondent attorney when the charges
are sustained.
-Elimination of jury trial disciplinary proceedings.
-Granting statewide subpoena power to every authorized disciplinary agency as
well as the attorney under investigation.
-Balancing the makeup of disciplinary agencies by having membership include
single and small-firm practitioners, members of minority groups, and attorneys
engaged in negligence and criminal law. Members would serve three-year terms
with appointments staggered to rotate one-third of the membership annually.
-- Court rules providing that any attorney who regularly engages in practice within
a jurisdiction submits himself to the disciplinary jurisdiction of that court. - "
-=Curt rules giving disciplinary agencies power to give warnings to attorneys for
minor misconduct. Notice of such admonitions would be recorded permanently.
ABA, PROBLEMS mNm RECOMMENDATIONS iN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970).
68 Id.
69 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (West 1962).
ToId.
71 Id. 1 6106.
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causes or may establish disciplinary commissions to hold hearings
subject to review by the California Supreme Court.72 The Board of
Governors or its disciplinary commissions may recommend to the
California Supreme Court that an attorney be suspended from prac-
tice for any wilful breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct.73
They may also discipline members of the State Bar by public or
private reproval.74
California has sufficient existing statutory power to enforcejudicial disciplinary rules; what is lacking are the rules themselves.
The solution to this problem, however, may be just a step away. As
proposed earlier in this comment, California should incorporate the
provisions of Canon DR 7-106(C) into the State's substantive law
so that they will have binding legal effect. 7' The Legislature could
incorporate Canon DR 7-106(C) into the existing Business and
Professions Code. Furthermore, the State Bar Board of Governors
and the Supreme Court of California could formulate the new pro-
visions as enforceable Rules of Professional Conduct.
To provide uniform and effective enforcement of the new rules,
the author proposes that California establish an extra-judicial com-
mission under the auspices of the California State Bar Board of
Governors. It seems entirely feasible that such a commission could
take over completely certain functions now being performed by
California's intermediate appellate courts. The Review Commission
could function in the areas of both contempt and prejudicial error
in the following ways:
(A) Contempt. Contempt citations against attorneys would
continue to be issued by the trial judge. The Board of Governors
Review Commission would automatically review the attorney's trial
conduct for possible violations of the Rules of Conduct, which would
include the provisions of Canon DR 7-106(C). While the trial judge
would have authority to cite an attorney's conduct as contemptuous,
the Review Commission would determine the issue of appropriate
disciplinary action, if any. Discipline imposed on the attorney would
range from reproval to suspension from practice. The Commission's
careful weighing of an attorney's conduct against the trial judge's
72 "[T]he provisions of this article [concerning the disciplinary authority of
the State Bar's Board of Governors] provide a complete alternative and cumulative
method of hearing and determining accusations against members of the State Bar."
Id. § 6075.
78 Id. § 6078.
7' Id. § 6077.
75 The ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics, which the Code of Professional
Responsibility replaced as of January 1, 1970, has in the past served merely as
an advisory standard in California. Id. § 6076.
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charges and the criteria of the Rules of Professional Conduct would
provide a means of competent review without appeal to an inter-
mediate appellate court.
(B) Prejudicial Error. An appeal based on alleged preju-
dicial error involves possible violations of the substantial rights of a
plaintiff or defendant. These appeals, therefore, must continue to be
processed to an appellate court of law. If an appellate court found
that the trial attorney had committed prejudicial error, the Board of
Governors Review Commission would determine any disciplinary
action to be taken against him.
(C) Ultimate Jurisdiction. An attorney disciplined by the
Board of Governors Review Commission could appeal to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.16
Adoption of the recommended system of enforceable rules will
help unclog California's overburdened appellate court dockets. But
this relief is not the only benefit that would inure to the legal pro-
fession of our state. Today, more than ever, public attention is
focused on the courtroom arena. Properly applied, Canon DR 7-106
(C) could help the trial attorney take his rightful place in the public
forum as the recognized vanguard of justice.
Charles F. Edgemon
76 At present, disciplinary hearings of the State Bar Board of Governors are
subject to review by the California Supreme Court. Id. § 6078.
77 "It is only by having clearly defined, generally accepted, and courageously
enforced standards of conduct for all branches of the profession that we can hope
to inspire that public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the admin-
istration of justice that is so essential.'"-Bernard G. Segal, President, American
Bar Association. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Jul. 2, 1970 at 1, col. 7.
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